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Abstract 
 
 
When the European External Action Service (EEAS) became operational on 1 January 2011 it 
was still not clear exactly what position it occupies in the pluralistic EU external 
policymaking system, where member states and supranational actors already operate with 
varying degrees of influence and autonomy. One way of clarifying this issue is to discuss the 
degree of autonomy the EEAS may have and to whom it is accountable. This paper uses a 
principal-agent (PA) framework of analysis to discuss the EEAS’ institutional design and 
policy mandates. Can the EEAS act autonomously? Are there policy areas in which the EEAS 
has greater decision-making autonomy than others? Such questions are central to discussions 
of the post-Lisbon Treaty EU’s role as an international actor. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The European External Action Service (EEAS) is the European Union’s latest bureaucratic 
actor, created specifically for making and implementing external policy and representing the 
EU abroad.1 The 2009 Lisbon Treaty’s creation of a ‘double hatted’ office of High 
Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy/Commission Vice President 
(HR/VP) supported by the EEAS is an attempt to boost the EU’s gravitas in dealings with 
third countries, regions and international organisations. It is also intended as a means for 
overcoming the ‘functional indivisibility’ of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 
and external relations decision-making, the mandates for which were previously split between 
the EU Council Secretariat and the European Commission (Stetter 2004). However the Treaty 
did not specify how the new institutional setting would work in practice when it came into 
force on 1 December 2009. When the EEAS became operational on 1 January 2011 it was still 
not clear exactly what position it occupies in the pluralistic EU external policymaking system, 
where member states and supranational actors already operate with varying degrees of 
autonomy and influence. One way of clarifying this issue is to discuss the degree of autonomy 
the HR/VP and the EEAS may have, their role in relation to existing actors, and to whom they 
are accountable. 
 
The EEAS initiative caused consternation in some member state capitals as it became a 
reality. Member governments and foreign ministries treated the negotiations that led to the 
July 2010 Council Decision ‘establishing the organisation and functioning of the European 
External Action Service’ as a trade-off between seeking the maximise the advantages of 
pooling resources and trying to retaining control over foreign policy strategy, tactics and 
visibility. The Commission fought hard to retain its accumulated external policy 
responsibilities while some officials privately lamented the decision to create a new 
organisation rather than empowering DG Relex with a greater role. Questions were also asked 
about the EEAS’ potential independence from other Community institutions, especially the 
Commission and the Parliament. The European Parliament (EP) EEAS rapporteur Elmar 
Brok worried that the EU was about to create a new bureaucracy ‘located in the middle 
                                                 
1
 For the purposes of this paper, the term ‘external policy’ refers to policy areas under the mandate of the High 
Representative and the External Action Service. This includes ‘external relations’ (policy areas where decisions 
are taken in the European Commission) and ‘foreign policy’ (policy areas where decisions are taken in the 
European Council). The borders between these areas of responsibility are not clearly defined. Unless otherwise 
specified, the acronym ‘EEAS’ is taken to include the office of High Representative/ Vice President as well as 
the bureaucracy that supports her. 
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between the Council and the Commission which in the long term would… lead a life of its 
own to become an independent kingdom outside our control.’2 
 
This paper uses a principal-agent (PA) framework of analysis as a basis for discussing the 
EEAS’ institutional design and policy mandates.3 The central task for the EEAS’ architects is 
to produce a coherent institutional framework that will help improve the EU’s global presence 
and its effectiveness in pursuing common international objectives. This is a considerable 
challenge: the EEAS needs to be able to take decisions in the policy areas under its mandate 
that other actors will adhere to, even if these are sometimes costly. It also needs to remain 
accountable to its many principals, and thus a legitimate representative of their values and 
interests. Will the EEAS be able to act autonomously, in the sense that it is able to take 
decisions that may restrict the freedom of other actors in the system to pursue their own 
interests, and which they might therefore oppose? Are there policy areas in which the EEAS 
has greater decision-making autonomy than others? Such questions are central to discussions 
of the post-Lisbon Treaty EU’s role as an international actor. 
 
The rest of this paper is arranged as follows. The next section outlines the principal-agent 
framework and the ways in which it has been used to highlight various aspects of the EU 
integration and external policy processes. The literature suggests two hypothetical claims that 
purport to answer the questions posed above. First, the likelihood that the an agent can carve 
out an autonomous position for itself is greater when there are several principals, as there is a 
good chance that it will be able to exploit conflicting preferences among them. Paradoxically, 
the EEAS’ autonomy will be limited because EU member states and the Commission have 
taken steps to guard against this possibility, at least in the short term. Second, the literature 
suggests that the nature and credibility of controls influence the degree of agent autonomy, 
and that this may vary across policy areas. Although the EEAS’ independence overall will be 
limited, it will have opportunities to carve out its own niche, and this may lead – through 
linked processes of accumulation and socialisation – to greater autonomy in the medium to 
long term. The third section discusses the positions of the EEAS’ principals and the ex-ante 
and ex-post mechanisms they have agreed upon that define the EEAS’ policy mandates and 
autonomy. EU member states and the Commission have not fully delegated responsibility to 
the EEAS but have retained important roles for themselves in all of the Service’s main areas 
                                                 
2
 Euractiv, http://www.euractiv.com/en/future-eu/eus-new-diplomatic-service-linksdossier, accessed 23 
December 2010. 
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of operation. The EEAS will also be closely monitored. Section 4 discusses the implications 
for policymaking in three key areas of the EEAS’ mandate: diplomacy and diplomatic 
representation, Common Foreign and Security Policy/ Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CFSP/CSDP), and development policy. A final section concludes with implications for the 
EU’s international ‘actorness’ and issues for further research. 
 
 
2. The principal-agent framework 
 
The principal-agent model is a microeconomics concept drawn from the theory of the firm 
that has been used extensively by political scientists as a framework for explaining actor 
relationships. Despite certain limitations, principal-agent theory has produced valuable 
hypotheses purporting to explain why, how and under what circumstances political actors 
delegate policymaking and implementation to other actors, and what the ‘agent’ does with the 
responsibilities it is granted (Bauer 2002). The core assumption of principal-agent theory is 
that when one party (the principal) contracts another (the agent) to do something on their 
behalf, the agent has an incentive to act independently of the principal, potentially in ways 
that run counter to the principal’s preferences (Fama 1980). This can lead to a form of moral 
hazard, as the agent can exploit information asymmetry about the available options for action 
and take steps that harm the interests of the principal with minimal costs to itself (Bauer 2002, 
p. 382). The principal, aware that there is potential for Pareto-sub-optimal outcomes, attempts 
to incentivise agent behaviour that is also in line with the principal’s preferences. 
 
The essential tension in the principal-agent relationship stems from the possibility of ‘agency 
slippage’ – that the agent can undertake actions on its own initiative, including behaviour that 
the principal may not welcome. Principals can try to restrict their agent, but this may be costly 
to implement and may limit the agent’s ability to perform its tasks effectively (Kassim and 
Menon 2003). Information asymmetries are central to this tension. A bureaucratic agent is 
likely to know more about its own interests and the way that it functions than any principal, 
and it is likely to be difficult for principals to acquire this information (Pollack 1997, p. 108). 
Managing this tension is a challenge for institutional design, especially where the rules of 
delegation result from bargaining among principals with a range of preferences regarding the 
outcomes they want the agent to achieve. 
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An implication of the principal-agent relationship is the concept of bureaucratic autonomy: 
the Weberian idea that once created, bureaucracies are able to act independently of the 
legislative and executive authorities that gave them their original mandate (Beem 2009). The 
central assumption of this thesis is that left unchecked a bureaucracy will develop 
independently of legislative and even executive constraints. There are several implications 
that weigh upon considerations of institutional design: first, institutions are often assumed to 
be ‘sticky’ – established bureaucracies do not give up policymaking responsibilities easily 
(Alexander 2001). Third, while bureaucratic inertia is a well known (and sometimes 
convenient) whipping-boy for the inability to make policy changes, demonstrations of 
competence and effectiveness over a period of time, networks of contacts with organised 
interests, and a public reputation for even-handedness are all important sources of leverage 
that can induce voluntary cooperation with a bureaucracy’s chosen path. Fourth, bureaucrats 
are sometimes able to act in accordance with the interests of their institution even when these 
are not the same as those of elected politicians who grant them their mandates (Carpenter 
2001). 
 
In the foreign policy sphere, mandates are not granted exclusively to foreign ministries but are 
shared by a number of public sector agents, posing complex challenges for coordination and 
control (Hill 2003). In the long run, bureaucracies acting in the international sphere can shape 
the strategies and even the preferences of domestic political actors (Beem 2009). International 
bureaucracies that deal with several issues may induce cooperation even when doing so goes 
against established preferences, because the opportunity costs of not taking part may be 
higher than the short term costs of engagement (Reinalda and Verbeek 1998). 
 
There are two main types of control that principals use to limit agent autonomy: ex ante 
controls that are built into an agent’s institutional design and policy mandate, and ex-post 
controls that try to ensure that the agent remains within these boundaries (Pollack 1997). Ex-
ante and ex-post control mechanisms overlap to some extent. By defining the limits of the 
agent’s mandate, the procedures that it must follow, and the oversight procedures that will be 
in place to monitor the agent ex post, the principals can try to reduce the possibilities of 
agency slippage (Pollack 1997, p. 108). While the design of ex-ante controls should be a 
direct trade-off between the costs to the principal and the costs to the agent’s ability to 
perform its function, there is a possibility that risk-averse principals will over-restrict an 
agent’s independence, especially as judging the future impact of restrictions is difficult. Ex-
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post measures include monitoring and sanctions. Both measures are expensive: monitoring 
requires time, personnel and effort to maintain adequate information, while sanctions can also 
be costly for the principal. Over-zealous ex-post controls also risk limiting the agent’s 
effectiveness. 
 
The limitations of principal-agent theory lie in its essentially positivist conceptualisation of 
politics as an arena in which falsifiable hypotheses can be developed and tested empirically 
against competing theoretical claims (Bauer 2002). As such the approach cannot adequately 
capture the normative dimensions of European integration – the ‘principle’ as opposed to the 
‘principal’ acting as a driving force in the process. As Pollack (1997, p. 107) points out, the 
principal-agent approach cannot explain why budgetary and legislative powers have been 
delegated to the European Parliament, and the successive empowering of the Parliament in the 
EU’s Treaties. This is because the Parliament’s role is determined more by concerns about 
democratic legitimacy than efficient delegation. A further limitation is the methodological 
concern noted by Hodson that ‘the sheer applicability of this approach’ can lead to ‘over-
determination of principal-agent relationships’ (2009, p. 455). These limitations do not, 
however, detract from the usefulness of the PA approach as a tool for unravelling the 
complexities of the political processes leading to institutional design and delegation in the 
EU, so long as it is ‘handled with care’ (Maher, Billiet and Hodson 2009). 
 
 
2.1 The principal-agent approach to EU integration and external relations 
 
Principal-agent models and theories of delegation have been widely used to study the EU 
policymaking process and have revealed valuable insights about how the EU functions. In 
turn, the EU integration process has provided vast amounts of empirical material for testing 
PA theories, especially for scholars working in the liberal institutionalist tradition. As Billiet 
(2009, p. 451) put it, ‘part of the genius of the PA approach as it is applied to the study of the 
EU is that the notion of ‘delegation’ accommodates, in a very simple way, much of the 
underlying institutional complexity of the European construction’. The starting point for these 
studies is that the EU reduces the transaction costs of multi-actor bargaining, facilitating 
member state agreement on broad issues. Once a broad agreement is reached, detailed 
implementation can be left to an agent, in most cases the European Commission (Pollack 
1997). 
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Much of this literature focuses on the degree of independence of supranational actors – 
especially the Commission – and asks about the extent to which member states can control the 
actions of these actors (Tallberg 2002, p. 24). Other studies have included analyses of the 
independence and influence of the European Court of Justice, which through jurisprudence 
and accumulated legitimacy has evolved into a powerful actor in the EU system (Caporaso 
and Tarrow 2009). The independence of the European Central Bank has also been the subject 
of PA studies concerned with questions of efficiency, transparency and legitimacy (Tallberg 
2005). Scholars have discussed the independence of EU agencies created to carry out various 
specific functions, including FRONTEX (Pollak and Slominski 2009). Principal-agent 
approaches have also been used to capture the dynamics of relationships between EU-level 
actors such as the European Council and the Commission. Both organisations receive 
delegated responsibilities from member states, but tensions have arisen from time to time in 
areas where the division of labour has not been clear (Bauer 2002, Dijkstra 2009). On a 
slightly different tack, a few studies have discussed the ability of EU-level institutions to act 
as principals vis-à-vis member states (Hodson 2009) and non-EU actors in its neighbourhood 
(Bodenstein and Furness 2009, Schimmelfennig and Scholz 2008). These studies focus not so 
much on delegation as on the EU’s ability to induce desired behaviour from partner 
governments. 
 
The PA approach has been used less often to explain the EU’s external policymaking and 
implementation. Several studies have dealt with the Commission’s agency in international 
trade negotiations, while other scholars have focussed on other aspects of external economic 
relations such as monetary policy, competition policy and development (da Conceição 2010, 
Dür and Elsig 2010, Billiet 2009). These studies show that there is a strong incentive for EU 
member states to create common external relations instruments and bureaucratic frameworks 
to act on their behalf. Once a common position on an external policy issue is reached, the 
details of policy and implementation cannot easily be worked out by national ministries 
because of informational, time and capacity constraints (K. Smith 2008). As Dür and Elsig 
point out, external policymaking in the EU is actually a string of principal-agent relationships 
between various constellations of actors and levels in the system: societal interests, lobbies 
and voters delegate to national and  decision-makers, legislators delegate to executives, 
member states delegate to the EU institutions, the EU delegates to third countries and 
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international organisations (Dür and Elsig 2011, p. 2) At each level there are multiple 
principals and assessing autonomy and control is a complex task. 
 
 
2.2 A principal-agent approach to the EEAS: two hypothetical explanations for 
delegation 
 
Tallberg (2002, p. 24) proposed a four-stage, cyclical framework for accounting for 
delegation and its extent in the EU context: first, the expected consequences of delegation 
motivate the decision to delegate; second, the nature of the policy area influences the types of 
control mechanisms established; third, institutional design shapes the consequences of 
delegation by incentivising or discouraging independent action; and fourth, the consequences 
of previous rounds of delegation affect future decisions to delegate and future control 
mechanisms. This cycle provides a useful starting point for explaining the process of 
delegation during the EEAS’ roll-out. The notion that EU member states created the EEAS 
because they wanted to pool resources but were wary of further empowering the Commission 
is in line with Tallberg’s first supposition. Tallberg’s third and second suppositions raise two 
hypothetical explanations purporting to account for the post-Lisbon treaty system of ex-ante 
and ex-post controls, the overlap of the EEAS’ policy responsibilities with those of the 
Commission and member states, and the apparent variation of autonomy across policy areas. 
 
First, the EEAS will build its autonomy by exploiting differences among its many 
principals. 
 
This argument is supported by the observation that EU member states created the EEAS 
because they were reluctant to further empower the Commission’s growing external policy 
capacities, and instead chose to create a new institutional actor. It is also supported by fears 
expressed by the European Parliament that the EEAS will be detached from other EU 
institutions. Just as the Commission has at times acted purposefully to pursue partisan 
objectives in several policy areas, the EEAS should not be expected to act as a neutral 
representative of member states in the international arena. It is likely that the EEAS will try to 
act in ways that increase its budget, widen its areas of responsibilities and increase its 
bureaucratic autonomy. As a means of pursuing this goal it may develop tendencies to de 
facto prioritise some of the policy objectives in its mandate over others. It may also act as an 
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entrepreneur and seek to build coalitions with some member states or even non-EU actors on 
given issues or with regard to certain partner countries. Member state and EU-level principals 
will act to limit the EEAS developing the capacity to take decisions they might disagree with. 
 
Second, the EEAS’ autonomy will vary across policy areas because checks and balances 
vary along with differing decision-making procedures. 
 
As Pollack (1997, p. 101) argued, the efficacy and credibility of control mechanisms 
established by member state principals varies from institution to institution and across issue 
areas, leading to varying patterns of supranational autonomy. The EEAS has responsibilities 
in several policy areas with varying decision-making rules and procedures. The rules matter: 
the Commission has more leeway for influencing the outcome when it makes a proposal in 
policy areas using QMV as opposed to unanimity (Billiet 2009, p. 440). Mixed competence 
policy areas raise further possibilities. It is therefore likely that the EEAS will also enjoy 
greater autonomy in some areas than in others. 
 
 
3. The 2010 EEAS negotiations over ex-ante and ex-post controls 
 
The argument that simplifying the institutional setting for EU external policymaking would 
ease decision-making and help strengthen Europe’s capacity for joint action has been debated 
in Europe for several years.4 Proposals for an EU Constitutional Treaty that emerged from the 
Convention on the Future of Europe (2002 – 2003) recognised the necessity of institutional 
mechanisms for linking the EU’s various external policies (Behr, Siitonen and Nykänen 
2010). Nevertheless as some observers have pointed out, the new institutional setting reflects 
not only a desire to improve the efficiency of external policy decision-making, but is also 
indicative of a belief that intergovernmental diplomacy should be infused with aspects of the 
‘functionalist’ EU integration process (Lefebvre and Hillion 2010). Whether the EEAS is able 
to exert an independent, driving influence on EU foreign policymaking – as functionalist 
theory contends the Commission has been able to do with regard to the former ‘first pillar’ in 
particular – will be among the more interesting (and contentious) aspects of the Service’s first 
few years of operation. 
 
                                                 
4
 See Joschka Fischer, ‘From Confederacy to Federation: Thoughts on the Finality of European Integration,’ 
speech at the Humboldt University, Berlin, 12 May 2000. 
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As an agent, the EEAS acts on behalf of several principals. These include, inter alia, member 
states with strong foreign policy preferences such as Britain, France, Germany, Spain, Italy, 
the Netherlands, Sweden and Poland. Several institutional actors at the EU level also delegate 
to the EEAS, including the Commission, its President, and the permanent Council Presidency. 
Although the European Parliament does not explicitly delegate responsibilities to the EEAS 
the Service acts on its behalf in a broader sense, particularly through it delegations which 
represent the EU in its entirety in foreign countries and international organisations. 
 
Member states, the Commission and the European Parliament were all aware of the 
importance of jockeying for influence in the period before the EEAS was launched. The 
EEAS negotiations of 2010 were quite acrimonious as several European actors (notably parts 
of the European Commission, its President José Manuel Barroso, parts of the Council 
Secretariat, the European Parliament and some member states) either seized on the Lisbon 
Treaty’s vague reference to the EEAS as a chance to push for greater influence over external 
policy, or tried to prevent perceived power-grabs by other actors (Furness 2010, pp. 6 – 10). 
As one well-informed observer has remarked, ‘the turf fighting that has accompanied the 
whole process should have surprised no one who has had any working experience of the 
Brussels decision-making machine’ (Hannay 2010, p. 78). The first round of this bargaining 
process concluded with the 26 July 2010 Council Decision establishing the organisation and 
functioning of the European External Action Service (European Council 2010). 
 
 
3.1 The principals 
 
Member states 
 
The Lisbon Treaty’s creation of a new agent for external policy reveals awareness on the part 
of member states of the potential benefits of pooling their resources, but also a desire to 
control the outcome. Most obviously, the decision reveals reluctance on the part of EU 
member states to empower the European Commission as their representative in international 
affairs. Although an external policy bureaucracy already existed in the form of DG Relex, 
member states’ desire to maintain intergovernmental decision-making on the CFSP 
necessitated the creation of a new Service, rather than strengthening the Commission’s 
external policy competencies. The Commission, an established actor with a wide array of 
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resources and a tradition of pushing the boundaries of its mandate, would have been far more 
difficult to control than a service with responsibilities limited to external policy. EU member 
governments have thus tried to achieve a middle road arrangement which makes better use of 
pooled resources and common external policy positions, and yet remains closely tied to the 
European Council. 
 
The central dilemma for the British, French and German governments was to balance their 
interests in a strong diplomatic role for the EU with their desire to maintain their own 
diplomatic networks and bilateral relationships. The EU’s larger member states pushed for an 
arrangement that would empower the High Representative and the EEAS at the expense of the 
Commission, while at the same time limiting their independence by keeping them closely tied 
to the Council. HR Ashton made several trips to Berlin, Paris and London to conduct 
meetings at the highest level and the ‘big three’ moved to ensure representation in key 
positions of the EEAS hierarchy. In late February a difference of opinion appeared between 
France and Germany on one hand and the UK on the other. The French and German 
governments were uncomfortable with Ashton’s reliance on British officials in her personal 
cabinet and EEAS working group, which they interpreted as a perfidious attempt to secure 
long-term influence over EU external policy for the UK. In a classic diplomatic ‘shot across 
the bows’, an internal German Foreign Ministry document was leaked to the Guardian in 
which German officials expressed dismay at British domination of the EEAS’ roll-out.5 
 
The Commission and its President 
 
The Commission, acutely aware that the gathering Euro crisis was pressuring member state 
enthusiasm for integration, did not want to lose competencies accumulated over decades to 
the EEAS. Commission President Barroso moved early to secure a strong influence for the 
Commission in the EEAS through his insistence that the Commissioners for Development, 
Enlargement/ Neighbourhood and Humanitarian Affairs would work closely with the High 
Representative and the EEAS ‘to ensure coherence in our external policy.’6 The College of 
Commissioners has retained the responsibility for ensuring coherence across all common EU 
policies with external dimensions, including trade, humanitarian affairs, enlargement, climate 
action, energy and fisheries. Barroso also ensured a strong Commission say over policy areas 
                                                 
5
 Guardian 28 Feb. 2010. 
6
 President José Manuel Barroso, letters to Commissioners Piebalgs, Füle and Georgieva, 
Nov. 2009/Jan. 2010. 
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that were partially transferred to the EEAS, such as development, neighbourhood policy and 
conflict prevention/ peacebuilding policy (Lefebvre and Hillion 2010). He even managed to 
secure key positions in the EEAS hierarchy – such as head of Delegation in Washington – for 
his allies. 
 
One of the main justifications for the Lisbon Treaty’s creation of the two-hatted HR/VP and 
the EEAS was to ease the tension between the Commission and the Council by placing the 
EU’s external policy bureaucracy under one chain of command. However, mandates continue 
to overlap and there is a high probability that inter-institutional rivalry over external policy 
competencies will continue under the Lisbon Treaty. This leaves great potential for turf war 
and deadlock, particularly as the Commission will control the EEAS’ operational budget. The 
Commission is to retain the ‘foreign policy instruments service’ which will administer EU 
funds earmarked for external policy but which cannot be transferred to the EEAS. 
Significantly, this service will manage the Instrument for Stability, a key tool for bridging 
security and development policies and therefore a core area of operation for the EEAS.7 
 
The European Parliament 
 
The European Parliament cannot be properly considered a ‘principal’ – it does not delegate 
authority to the EEAS. However the EP has more influence over EU external policy than 
many national parliaments have over the activities of the executive outside their borders. It 
holds hearings for Commissioners and exercises budgetary oversight of many of the EU’s 
external policy instruments. It also has an important oversight role in external policy, a role 
that was enhanced by the Lisbon Treaty and by the July Council Decision, which it worked 
hard to influence. 
 
MEPs were particularly forthright in raising concerns about the potential for EEAS autonomy 
during the negotiations leading to the July Council Decision. In a statement in response to HR 
Ashton’s initial March 24 2010 proposal, MEPs argued that ‘The proposed structure with an 
omnipotent secretary-general and deputy secretary-generals does not provide the politically 
legitimised deputies that the High Rep needs in order to do her job properly.’8 MEP Elmar 
Brok referred to the post of EEAS Secretary-General as a ‘French-style spider’ running the 
                                                 
7
 European Voice 28 October 2010. 
8
 Elmar Brok ‘EEAS proposal unacceptable to the European Parliament,’ press release 25 March 2010, available 
at www.elmarbrok.de, accessed 20 December 2010. 
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EEAS ‘web’ from the centre. Later in the year MEP Ingeborg Grässle, chair of the European 
Parliament’s budgetary committee, tried to prevent the EP’s approval of Ashton’s proposal on 
the grounds that the Parliament was throwing away its ability to push for transparency in the 
EEAS’ staffing and financial regulations. Grässle was able to delay the Parliament’s final 
approval until October 2010 when an agreement was struck with HR Ashton and member 
states granting the Parliament greater oversight and auditing powers.9 
 
 
3.2 The Agents 
 
The office of the High Representative/Commission Vice President 
 
Baroness Ashton is a unique kind of ‘super-agent’ in that her office forms the link between 
the various principals and the EEAS. As MEP Elmar Brok argues, ‘the key to the EEAS’ 
success lies in the post of EU High Representative and Commission Vice President’ (Brok 
2010, p. 79). The office of the High Representative has considerable agency embodied in the 
agenda-setting powers derived from Ashton’s right to propose legislation on CFSP matters as 
HR, and on external relations matters as VP, and her cabinet therefore performs a crucial role 
in the EU system as conduit for delegation. Ashton, it is often mentioned, wears two hats: she 
is the EU’s High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy and the 
Commissioner for External Relations, which carries the added responsibility of being 
Commission Vice President. In fact, she has several other ‘hats’ as well: she is chair of the 
European Council foreign affairs and defence configurations which also deal with security 
policy, development policy and trade policy; she is the UK’s Commissioner, which implies a 
national advocacy role, and she is head of the EEAS, which means she is responsible for 
operations.10 As there is no way for one person to perform all of these roles, Ashton must 
herself delegate certain responsibilities to deputies and parts of the EEAS. 
 
Ashton has a special role in ‘coordinating’ the work of Development Commissioner Andris 
Piebalgs, Enlargement/ Neighbourhood Commissioner Štefan Füle, and Humanitarian 
Assistance Commissioner Kristalina Georgieva. This effectively makes her the second most 
                                                 
9
 European Voice 28 October 2010. 
10
 The author would like to thank ‘Victor’ for the reminder of Catherine Ashton’s many roles: see 
http://polscieu.ideasoneurope.eu/2011/01/08/participation-in-eu-commission-meetings-a-measure-of-ashtons-
lack-of-influence/, accessed 27 January 2011. 
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powerful member of the College of Commissioners after President Barroso. The demarcation 
of foreign affairs responsibility between Barroso and Ashton was not clarified by the July 
Council Decision, while the innovation of the External Relations Commissioner being ‘first 
among equals’ leaves potential for battles within the Commission. The lack of official 
guidelines leaves the resolution of these issues to the informal working relationships among 
the respective Commissioners and their staff. Such cooperation must stand the rigours of 
policymaking, but no rifts between Commissioners were visible during the 2010 EEAS 
negotiations. 
 
The External Action Service 
 
The Lisbon Treaty’s unification of the posts of HR and VP necessitated combining the foreign 
policy units of the Council Secretariat with the parts of the Commission that deal with 
international affairs. As if to acknowledge that the EEAS will act on behalf of multiple 
principals, the July Council Decision gives the Service two ‘tasks’ – to support the High 
Representative in fulfilling the mandates outlined in Articles 18 and 27 TEU, and to ‘assist 
the President of the European Council, the President of the Commission, and the Commission 
in the exercise of their respective functions in the area of external relations.’ Further, the 
EEAS ‘shall support, and work in cooperation with, the diplomatic services of the member 
states’ (European Council 2010, p. 201/32). 
 
According to its founding document the EEAS is ‘a functionally autonomous body of the 
Union under the authority of the High Representative’ (European Council 2010, p.201/30). 
Although EU officials are careful to refer to the EEAS as a ‘service’ and not an ‘institution’, it 
will be established as an ‘institution’ within the meaning of Article I of the EU’s financial 
regulation. From the legal point of view, the EEAS is unique among EU bureaucratic actors. 
It is not an institution, because has no powers of its own conferred by the EU Treaties. Its 
legal status will not be the same as the ‘European institutions’ – the Commission, Council, 
Parliament, the European Court of Justice or the European Court of Auditors. Nevertheless, 
the EEAS will be more than just an agency with external policy responsibilities such as 
FRONTEX or the European Defence Agency. Unlike many agencies, the EEAS does not have 
the ability to take administrative decisions in a given area that are legally binding. It is likely 
that its legal ‘personality’ will be defined over a period of time, possibly with the assistance of 
future Council Conclusions and decisions by the European Courts of Justice and Auditors. 
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3.3 Ex-post control mechanisms 
 
Pollack (1997, p. 101) identified four mechanisms by which member states can exercise ex-
post control over supranational agents: comitology oversight by the Council of Ministers, the 
possibility of judicial review by the ECJ, periodic Council Decisions that affect the 
Commission’s mandate, and the threat of amending the EU’s treaties. Not all are relevant in 
the case of the EEAS – it is unlikely that, for example, a Treaty amendment on external policy 
requiring the agreement of all 27 member states would be seriously contemplated in the short-
to medium term. To these may be added oversight by the European Parliament, which has 
been strengthened under the Lisbon Treaty. 
 
Member state monitoring: Comitology and COREUs 
 
Decisions about the detailed implementation EU legislation are taken at the Committee level, 
below the level of the Council of Ministers and the College of Commissioners. Several 
committees will oversee legislation and implementation in areas under the EEAS’ mandate, 
including the political and security committee (PSC), the Foreign Affairs Committee (FAC) 
and the development committee (CoDev). These committees are overseen by the Committee 
of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), which is chaired by the member state holding the 
rotating Presidency. Member states have often used these committees to pressure Commission 
action in specific policy areas. 
 
The Lisbon Treaty abolished the member state regulatory committees that scrutinised 
decisions prepared by the Commission and has given the European Parliament equal status to 
the Council in approving legislation. The Treaty distinguishes between ‘delegated’ acts 
(Article 290 TFEU) and ‘implementing’ acts (Article 291 TFEU), subject to different legal 
frameworks. Member states have reacted by trying to limit the instances in which it delegates 
decision-making to the Commission, and the Parliament has responded by arguing that such a 
step is contrary to the whole point of delegation, which is to speed up decision-making.11 As 
most external policy areas concern implementing acts, the implications of the Lisbon Treaty’s 
provisions on comitology are highly significant for the EEAS. A Regulation laying down the 
rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the 
                                                 
11
 European Voice 15 July 2010. 
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Commission’s exercise of implementing powers was approved by the European Parliament on 
16 December 2010 and entered into force on 1 March 2011. 
 
In addition to Committees, a further mechanism by which member states can monitor the 
EEAS’ activities is the COREU (Correspondance Europaenne) system. Ostensibly a system 
for exchanging information to speed up decision-making, COREUs have reportedly also been 
used for the purposes of monitoring the implementation of CFSP initiatives (Bicchi and Carta 
2010, p. 1). COREUs can be sent to all member states at the same time and can contain 
confidential details. Presumably they can also be requested by member states if and when they 
require clarification of specific details. The EEAS will take over the role of generating 
COREUs from the Council General Secretariat and will thus have the means for keeping 
member states informed. 
 
A third member state monitoring mechanism is the inclusion of member state officials in the 
EEAS. This may improve the flow of information from the Service to member state capitals 
and ministries and vice versa. Officially, seconded member state officials will owe first 
loyalty to the EU rather than to their home countries and will have to report home via official 
channels. However, regular briefings between officials serving with the EEAS and the 
relevant divisions of national ministries are likely. 
 
Parliamentary oversight 
 
The European Parliament fought to include clauses in the EEAS’ establishing documents that 
would enable it to exercise meaningful oversight of policy decisions and the activities of key 
officials. Their success in this endeavour was limited, and the July Council Decision only 
appears to give the EP a strong oversight role. The preamble states that ‘the European 
Parliament will fully play a role in the external action of the Union, including its functions of 
political control as provided for in Article 14(1) TEU… In accordance with Article 36 TEU, 
the High Representative will regularly consult the European Parliament on the basic choices 
of the CFSP and will ensure that the views of the European Parliament are taken into 
consideration’ (European Council 2010, p. 201/30). This clause only places the onus on the 
HR and the EEAS to ‘consult’ the Parliament ‘on the main aspects and the basic choices of 
CFSP’ but not on specific policy areas or programmes (European Council 2010, p. 201/30). 
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In practice, the EP will act as an informed public overseer, but does not have powers to stop a 
decision it does not agree with. Parliamentarians can try to get external policy actions 
annulled before the ECJ, but only if it believes that the Commission has exceeded its 
implementing powers. Presumably, this only applies for policies concerning external financial 
assistance instruments administered by the Commission and not CFSP/ CDSP actions. 
Furthermore, the EEAS’ administrative Directorate-General will report to Ashton in her 
capacity as Vice-President of the Commission rather than as High Representative for CFSP. 
This requires the EEAS’ budget to be subject to the same discharge procedure as that of the 
Commission, meaning that the Parliament will have annual right of approval. However the 
extent to which this right gives Parliamentarians policy leverage is unclear, as refusing 
approval for the EEAS’ budget would be a ‘nuclear option’ that would shut down the service 
completely and is unlikely to be contemplated even in the most serious of crises. 
 
 
4. Implications for EEAS autonomy and accountability 
 
Many observers have argued that the fundamental problem undermining the EU’s capacity as 
an international actor is the reluctance of member states to pool resources and empower the 
EU to act on their behalf. The Lisbon Treaty has not altered the reality that member states still 
exercise the right to act autonomously internationally. Rather, the establishment of the EEAS 
can be seen as an attempt to consolidate the responsibilities that the EU has already so that 
policies can be implemented more efficiently. 
 
 
4.1 Diplomacy and diplomatic representation 
 
The Lisbon Treaty was intended to strengthen the EU as a diplomatic actor, increase its 
potential to influence international events, and enable it to ‘speak with one voice’ on the 
international stage. The reality has been somewhat different since the Lisbon Treaty entered 
into force. Ashton cannot speak on behalf of Europe’s member states on foreign policy issues 
unless there is a clear common position, and this is difficult to forge in fast-moving 
diplomatic situations where member governments must themselves tread carefully. Moreover, 
in diplomatic protocol terms, Ashton cannot take the limelight away member state foreign 
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ministers, prime ministers, presidents and chancellors. National political interests still take 
precedence over stated common positions. 
 
The crisis surrounding the overthrow of the presidents of Tunisia and Egypt in early 2011 
offers a useful illustration of a diplomatic process for which the EEAS’ agent role is 
ambiguous. The institutional structures of the EU’s major diplomatic initiative in the region – 
the Union for the Mediterranean – have not been of any use in handling the crisis or engaging 
with key actors. HR Ashton has been criticised for not speaking out early and clearly in 
support of the protest movements in Tunisia and Egypt.12 However EU member states, many 
of whom have a long history of supporting the region’s authoritarian governments, expressed 
varying views on the situation.13 At the Munich security conference in February 2011, high 
profile speeches on Egypt were made by British Prime Minister David Cameron and German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel. Ashton was left to report on the more marginal outcomes of a 
meeting of the Middle East Quartet.14 
 
Ashton was criticised nonetheless for inaction on the Middle East crisis, just as she was in the 
immediate aftermath of the Haiti earthquake in January 2010. While much of this criticism is 
part of the rough-and-tumble of everyday EU politics, it is also indicative of the High 
Representative’s limited mandate in crisis situations. The EEAS’ ability to act autonomously 
as a diplomatic actor is likely to be greater on issues where the service has had an opportunity 
to push for a consensus among member states. It is also likely to be able to take a stronger 
stand where a clear international norm has been broken, even when member state positions 
are not identical. For example, HR Ashton made a high-profile visit to Gaza in March 2010 
and issued several strong statements following the Israeli military’s assault on Turkish ships 
attempting to breach the blockade of the Gaza Strip in late May. 
 
A second area in which the Lisbon Treaty is expected to enable a higher diplomatic profile for 
the EU is the status of its delegations to third countries and international organisations. 
Delegations have gained more tools to become agents of the EU. The former Commission 
delegations now represent the EU as a whole, and are expected to have a stronger political 
                                                 
12
 See, for example, Economist 3 February 2011, BBC news 2 February 2011. 
13
 Guardian 4 February 2011. Shortly before the resignation of former Egyptian president Mubarak, a joint 
statement by the UK, France and Germany called for free and fair elections with a reference to the Egyptian 
‘regime.’ Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi argued that Mubarak should remain in office while Egypt 
made the transition. 
14
 Neue Zürcher Zeitung 7 February 2011, p. 3. 
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voice and to engage with host governments on political issues. A shift in mindset lead towards 
seeing the delegations as embassies is likely to add the political dimension to the job 
description they already have. In theory, heads of EU delegation have the right of demarche 
over EU member state ambassadors, although in practice this is unlikely to happen very often. 
Despite these changes some EU officials do not believe that delegations will not have as much 
flexibility and autonomy following the Lisbon Treaty as they have had in the past. Their role 
will be more political but at the same time more circumscribed. Delegation heads have greater 
rights of initiative under the Lisbon Treaty, but any political statements they make first need 
clearance from headquarters in Brussels. 
 
 
4.2 CSDP/CFSP 
 
Decisions about when and where to use force are highly contested among EU member states 
and are therefore taken on a case-by-case basis. In addition, concerns among traditionally 
neutral EU member states such as Ireland, Austria and Sweden about the appropriateness of 
the EU as a military actor add to the sensitivity of the issue. Nevertheless, the EU does have 
the capability to project force when necessary despite generally limited enthusiasm for this 
within Europe. ESDP/CSDP missions to Congo, Chad and the Gulf of Aden are evidence that 
the EU and its members can send in military assets if there is a clear interest at stake and no 
strong opposition from within Europe. 
 
The EEAS does not have an agency role in this area but will instead coordinate missions once 
the decision has been taken to launch them. It also acts as a link between member states for 
organising preparedness. The part of the EEAS responsible will be the Service’s crisis 
management structures, which include the EU military committee, the European Defence 
Agency and the Committee for Civilian aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM). Crisis 
management decisions are taken in the Political and Security Committee, which is chaired by 
HR Ashton. 
 
It is possible that the EEAS’ CFSP/ CSDP responsibilities will grow over the next few years. 
Significantly, defence cooperation between France and Britain deepened in November 2010 
with the signing of agreements between French President Sarkozy and British Prime Minister 
Cameron in London. As was the case with the historic St. Malo entente of 1998 which led to 
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the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), closer ties between the EU’s two biggest 
military powers could drive deeper cooperation on defence across the EU. This is not a given 
as defence remains a member state priority, and there are divisions between the big member 
states on how best to use the EU as a platform. France and Britain have taken steps towards 
pooling resources bilaterally, but thus far have not included Germany, Poland or Spain. 
Germany and France are far more enthusiastic about a CSDP coordinated in Brussels than is 
the UK.15 The German, French and Polish foreign ministers have urged HR Ashton to take a 
leading role in facilitating discussion on boosting intra-EU military cooperation.16 However 
the big member states are all acutely aware that as individual nations the significance of their 
‘hard power’ is limited and cooperation on defence is essential. External pressure may 
concentrate minds – the United States, long suspicious of the rivalry deeper EU military 
cooperation may pose to NATO, has in recent years taken a firmer position favouring the 
pooling of military assets and cooperation on procurement among EU member states.17 
 
International agreements that have included clauses that touched on CFSP competencies, such 
as on weapons of mass destruction or political reform, have sometimes been led by the 
rotating Presidency acting on behalf of member states. Such agreements will become less 
frequent under the Lisbon Treaty as the EEAS will negotiate Union agreements that include 
CFSP and Commission responsibilities. In cases where agreements need to contain clauses 
that touch on member state prerogatives outside the CFSP and non-CFSP chapters of the 
TFEU, member states may still decide to opt to be represented by the EU Presidency 
(Commission legal service 2009, pp. 2 – 3) This is likely to result in greater autonomy for the 
EEAS as there are likely to be few cases where the EU will need to be represented by member 
states – the EEAS will negotiate most agreements alone and the permanent presidency will 
take care of nearly all remaining cases. Remaining cases are likely to be agreements touching 
on member state’s bilateral interests where there is a perception that the Union’s exercising of 
its competence would prevent member states from exercising theirs. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15
 David Cameron ‘Britain will remain a global power of the first order,’ Süddeutsche Zeitung 4 February 2011. 
See www.sueddeutsche.de (accessed 8 February 2011). 
16
 EU Observer 13 December 2010. 
17
 See James Blitz ‘Defence accords give tantalising hint of an EU undivided,’ Financial Times ‘The World 
2011,’ 26 January 2011, p. 8. 
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4.3 Development Policy 
 
EU development policy is a ‘shared competence’ between the European Commission and the 
member states. Policymaking and implementation is shared between member state bilateral 
activities, member state and Community contributions to multilateral organisations such as 
the United Nations and the World Bank, member state contributions to the EU-administered 
European Development Fund (EDF), and Community programmes funded by the EU budget, 
including the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) and the European Neighbourhood 
and Partnership Instrument (ENPI). Member states also engage in bilateral development 
relationships with partner countries which are considered a national prerogative, especially by 
the larger EU members. 
 
The decision to bring development policy – and programming responsibilities for its € 10 
billion per year budget – into the EEAS’ mandate intensified the intra-EU negotiations 
leading to the July 2010 Council Decision. Member state diplomats reportedly accused the 
Commission of ‘asset stripping’, while President Barroso expressed disappointment at the 
‘direct affront to Commission competence’ that the prospect of an EEAS role in development 
policymaking represented. Commission officials with long experience in EU development 
policy expressed private dismay at the shift towards intergovernmentalism and what they 
considered a member state power-grab over the EU’s development budget (Furness 2010, p. 
8). 
 
The July Council Decision transferred developing country desks into the EEAS and gave 
them co-programming responsibilities for the first three stages of the programming cycle for 
the EU’s development financing instruments, namely country allocation, country strategy 
papers and national indicative programming (European Council 2010, p. 201/36). Annual 
action programmes and implementation were left under the responsibility of the 
Commission’s new DG DevCo, formed from the policy units of DG Development and the 
EuropeAid agency. Development Commissioner Piebalgs retained overall responsibility for 
EU development policy, although HR Ashton is to ensure overall consistency of EU external 
action. This arrangement caused consternation among the development policy community 
largely because it was not clear how the relationship between the EEAS, DG DevCo and the 
relevant commissioners would work in practice (Duke and Blockmans 2010). 
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The prospect for agency slippage is likely to be higher in development policy than in CFSP or 
CDSP because the Commission acts as a principal in this policy area. Development 
cooperation agreements have traditionally been considered ‘mixed agreements’ which the 
Commission has negotiated and concluded even though some clauses may not have fallen 
within exclusive Commission competence. Member states have been able to exercise some 
control through the EDF committee, but in general they have been prepared to let the 
Commission lead the process because it has full competence over the DCI and ENPI 
(Commission Legal Service 2009). The EEAS will include a Development Cooperation 
Coordination section responsible for liaising between DG DevCo and the EEAS’ regional and 
country desks. The Service may even be able to become a kind of ‘double agent,’ especially 
where common ground with the Commission’s new DG DevCo can be found. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Since the dawn of European Political Cooperation in the early 1970s, there has been 
progressive institutionalisation of external cooperation in policy areas where member states 
recognise that collective action can bring greater benefits. Since the 1992 Maastricht Treaty 
major steps have been taken in coordinating the foreign policies of the EU’s member states, 
creating common mechanisms for pursuing shared interests, and defining those objectives in 
broad terms (K Smith 2008, pp. 3 – 9). The long-term trend towards external policy 
integration is real: multi-level decision-making has been institutionalised in the EU, while 
national sovereignty has been maintained. Balance and flexibility are managed through a 
complex web of institutional actors whose responsibilities are defined by formal and informal 
sets of rules. While progressive enlargements have increased the complexity of negotiations 
they have not prevented the emergence of a set of EU foreign policy institutions empowered 
to implement policy decisions reflecting much more than a ‘lowest common denominator’ of 
member state interests (M.E. Smith 2004 b). 
 
The principal-agent framework does not necessarily presuppose a zero-sum game between 
delegation and control. Just because member states have an interest in trying to control 
processes and influence outcomes does not mean they do not have an interest in delegating 
responsibilities and pooling resources. Nor does it imply that member states – even acting in 
concert – will be able to dictate policy choices and predetermine courses of action in all 
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cases. The EEAS and the officials who work there will seek opportunities for independent 
action where they can, and will sometimes succeed in wriggling free from member state, 
Commission and Parliamentary control. But member states, the Council Secretariat, the 
Commission, the Parliament and the ECJ do not usually actively oppose each other, but 
mostly work together towards common objectives. It is likely that the EEAS will complement 
this system. 
 
The July Council decision has many of the features of an ‘incomplete contract’ in that it 
provides a broad framework but leaves all important process-related details to be bedded in 
over the next few years (Kassim and Menon 2003). The new system will take time to bed in, 
for its imperfections to be recognised (and corrected where possible) and for the many actors 
it engages to work out strategies for making it work for them. Like any major bureaucratic 
organisation, the EEAS will never be perfect and formal and informal adjustments to various 
aspects of its operation and organisation will constantly be proposed, although not all will be 
implemented. It is to be expected that teething troubles will arise during its first few years in 
particular as internal glitches become apparent. Socialisation will play a big part in the 
process of achieving a new equilibrium, as institutional actors and officials settle on workable 
arrangements – both formal and informal – to organise policymaking responsibilities and 
exchange of information. 
 
Several potential equilibria are possible, from a best-case scenario where the EEAS sits at the 
centre of a whole-of-EU external policymaking system with clearly defined objectives and 
efficient division-of-labour arrangements for policymaking and implementation. At the other 
extreme, the new arrangements may fail to integrate important EU external policy actors, 
overlapping responsibilities may result in damaging turf wars, and actors may look for 
opportunities to pursue their own objectives at the expense of the system as a whole. A third – 
and more likely – scenario is that the system will function better in some policy areas than in 
others because certain decision-making procedures and means of delegation are more 
amenable to the new system than others. 
 
The EU’s various actors are unlikely to give the EEAS sufficient autonomy to represent them 
on the world stage while there is little agreement on the concrete strategic objectives the 
Service should pursue. The EU remains divided over what kind of international actor it should 
be – whether it should limit itself to economic power, whether it should pursue a broadly 
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normative agenda and lead by example, whether it should develop its ability to coerce and 
punish other actors. In the short- to medium-term, policy overlaps are likely to limit the 
EEAS’ efficiency – incoherence is literally built into the system because actors do not feel 
that they can trust each other enough to risk ironing them out. In the longer term, the lack of 
an agreed strategy could present the EEAS with a potentially serious problem. If the EU 
cannot reach a common position with regard to other international actors, such as China, 
Russia and Iran, then these actors will not take the Service (and the EU) seriously. 
 
This paper has attempted to show that the principal-agent framework can help clarify some of 
the issues raised by the EU’s efforts to build an external policy bureaucracy following the 
Lisbon Treaty. The intention is to provide a base upon which to build a study that may prove 
or disprove the explanations posed above: that the EEAS can exploit differences among its 
many principals to build its autonomy, and that autonomy is likely to vary across policy areas. 
In particular, indicators for measuring autonomy applicable to the EEAS context need to be 
specified. Once the EEAS has been in operation for a few years, comparative ‘before and 
after’ studies based on hard data will enhance academic and policy discussion on these issues. 
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